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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ROLAND LAVAR DENISON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs.. 
ALVIN D. CHAPMAN, CONTINENTAL 
OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and DORA 
HARTLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Brief of Defendant and Respondent 
Dora Hartley 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Dora Hartley agrees in full with the state-
ment of facts set forth in the brief of Alvin D. Chapman 
and Continental Oil Company, and adopts the whole thereof 
as her statement of facts. We believe that the brief of re-
spondent Alvin D, Chapman and Continental Oil Company 
fairly and accurately sets forth the facts as shown by the 
record on this appeal. We cannot agree with the statement 
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2 
of facts set forth in appellant's brief for the same reasons 
discussed in the brief of respondent Alvin D. Chapman and 
Continental Oil Company. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE BELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE 
JURY COULD FIND DEFENDANT DORA HARTLEY 
NEGLIGENT. 
POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS 
NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
POINT III 
IF DEFENDANT WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff's argument for recovery against Dora Hart-
ley seems to be founded on the theory that the jury could 
have found negligence on her part from the mere fact that: 
(1) The automobile driven by defendant Dora Hart-
ley collided with the truck driven by defendant Alvin Chap-
man, or that, 
(2) She was negligent for even trying to negotiate the 
hill or that, 
(3) Other drivers had successfully negotiated the hill 
without having an accident. 
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On page 13 of appellant's brief, he states: 
"It taxes credulity to believe that the accident could 
have happened if both Mr Chapman and Mrs. Hartley 
had been driving with due care commensurate with 
the hazards they knew existed." 
Such argument is fallacious and without merit. It is 
a matter of common knowledge that accidents occur with-
out the fault of either of the drivers. The mere fact that 
an automobile accident occurs does not warrant a recovery 
unless it can be shown that the injury or damage was caused 
by the negligence of the operator. It is essential to the 
existence of negligence that there be some fault on the part 
of the operator; no liability exists for an unavoidable acci-
dent. (5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439, Automobiles and Highway 
Traffic, Sees. 193 and 341). 
An unavoidable accident is such an occurrence as un-
der circumstances could not be foreseen or anticipated in 
exercise of ordinary care as the proximate cause of the 
injury by any of the parties. (Uncapher vs. Baltimore and 
O. R. Company, 127 Ohio St. 351, 188 N. E. 553). An acci-
dent which is caused by an absence of exceptional foresight, 
skill or care which the law does not expect of the ordinary 
prudent man is also characterized as inevitable or unavoid-
able. No redress is afforded for an injury caused by such 
an accident, and the loss must be borne by the one upon 
whom it falls. (Parker vs. Womack, 37 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P. 
2d 823, and authorities cited on page 825). 
In the case of Jolley vs. Clemen (82 Cal. App. 2d 55, 82 
Pac. 2d 51) the Supreme Court of California pointed out on 
page 61: 
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" . . if the accident was inevitable or unavoidable 
that is the same thing as to say that defendant was not 
negligent, or that his negligence, ,if any, did not cause 
the accident. In other words, it is to say that plaintiff 
has failed in his proof/' 
It is elementary that plaintiff has the burden of proof 
to show that defendants were negligent and that the negli-
gence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the in-
juries complained of. We are mindful that in a case where 
a verdict has been directed in favor of the respondents the 
evidence and all reasonableinferences therefrom must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant. We 
have carefully searched the record and can find no evidence 
from which the jury could find defendant Dora Hartley neg-
ligent. Plaintiff argues that they could have found that she 
was negligent for attempting to negotiate the hill. With 
this proposition we most earnestly disagree. Nor can we 
agree with the proposition that since others negotiated the 
hill without accident the jury could well find that defend-
ants were negligent because they had an accident. If either 
proposition were true plaintiff would likewise be guilty of 
negligence in attempting to negotiate the same hill and since 
he was involved in an accident. 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE 
JURY COULD FIND DEFENDANT DORA HARTLEY 
NEGLIGENT. 
The only evidence touching upon the conduct of de-
fendant Dora Harttey in operating her automobile was the 
testimony of Mrs. Hartley, Mr. Chapman and possibly that 
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of Mr. Denison. The testimony of Mrs. Hartley is undis-
puted and is corroborated by that of Mr. Chapman. She was 
driving up the hill entirely in the right hand lane at ap-
proximately 15 miles per hour and had her car completely 
under control from the time she entered the highway until 
it skidded in a counter-clockwise direction just as the oil 
truck began passing her. She didn't realize the highway 
was so slick until after she entered, and then she realized 
that it was extremely slick. Thereafter she drove very 
cautiously, since she had had previous experience in driv-
ing this hill under wintry conditions. 
In appellant's brief he keeps suggesting that Mrs. Hart-
ley "experienced great difficulty in keeping her car under 
control almost from the moment she entered the highway" 
and "she was struggling to get her vehicle up the hill." We 
have searched the record and can find no such evidence. 
In fact, the evidence shows otherwise. It is undisputed that 
the Hartley car did not weave or skid until the oil tanker 
came alongside of her automobile. The weaving of the 
Hartley automobile suggested by Mr. Denison could only 
be the counter-clockwise spin which resulted in the acci-
dent with the oil tanker and the clockwise spin which re-
sulted from the collision. 
The only possible theory remaining upon which the 
jury could find negligence upon the part of defendant Dora 
Hartley is from the mere fact that her automobile skidded. 
It is well settled that the mere fact that an automobile skids 
or slides on a slippery highway is not evidence, in and of 
itself, of negligence. This rule has been recognized by this 
Court and was applied in the case of West vs. Standard Fuel 
Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 Pac. 2d 292. In the West case, this 
Court held that the fact that plaintiff's automobile skidded 
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on a slippery highway into a truck standing in the traveled 
portion of the highway did not follow as a matter of law 
that plaintiff did not have his automobile under control. 
On page 294 this Court said: 
"There is no evidence that plaintiff did not have 
his car under control unless it may be said that the 
fact his automobile skidded into the truck is such evi-
dence. Such fact may not be said to show as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiff did not have his car under con-
trol." 
If the automobile were carefully operated, and was 
caused to skid through no fault of the operator, but due to 
conditions of the highway beyond his control, then the op-
erator is not guilty of negligence, and the accident is deemed 
unavoidable. (See 5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439 Automobile 
and Highway Traffic, Sees. 193 and 341). 
The evidence conclusively shows that the highway 
was extremely slippery. The evidence further shows with-
out dispute that the automobile driven by defendant Dora 
Hartley skidded with no fault on her part. Since skidding 
in and of itself is not evidence of negligence, there is no evi-
dence from which the jury could find Mrs. Hartley negli-
gent. The trial court properly granted the motion of de-
fendant Dora Hartley for an involuntary dismissal. Not 
only was such action proper, but the evidence demanded it, 
to prevent the jury from speculating on a verdict. The same 
action was upheld by this Court in the case of Lockheed 
vs. Jensen, 42 Utah 199, 129 Pac. 347, where the evidence 
of negligence was held to be insufficient to go to the jury 
where a car was driven at a lawful rate of speed on a coun-
try road and skidded upon running into ruts of chuck holes 
partly filled with sand. 
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POINT n 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS 
NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE'. 
Apparently appellant does not contend in his brief that 
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies to defendant Dora 
Hartley. If there be any question about its application, we 
submit that it does not apply. The authorities cited in the 
brief of Respondents Alvin D. Chapman and Continental 
Oil Co. demonstrates that the law is well settled that the 
mere fact that an automobile skids on a slippery pavement 
does not of itself constitute evidence of negligence on the 
driver's part so as to render the Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine 
applicable. 
To avoid repetition we adopt and incorporate in full 
the argument set forth under this point in the brief of Re-
spondents Alvin D. Chapman and Continental Oil Co. 
POINT III 
IF DEFENDANT WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, 
The argument set forth in the brief of Respondents 
Alvin D. Chapman and Continental Oil Company very ably 
demonstrates that if defendant Dora Hartley were negligent, 
plaintiff was equally negligent. It is difficult to understand 
how plaintiff can claim that the jury could find Dora Hart-
ley negligent for attempting to negotiate the hill and not be 
required to find plaintiff equally as negligent for attempt-
ing to drive down the same hill, which according to the 
evidence was even more hazardous. Since we would have 
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nothing more to add, we adopt and incorporate the argu-
ment set forth under this point in the brief of Respondents 
Alvin D. Chapman and Continental Oil Company. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is no evidence from which the jury could 
find defendant Dora Hartley negligent, the trial court prop-
erly granted her motion for involuntary dismissal. If there 
were any conduct on the part of the defendants from which 
the jury could have found negligence, the jury would have 
been required to find contributory negligence on the part 
of plaintiff, since his conduct was of the same kind. The 
accident was clearly unavoidable, without negligence of any 
party, as determined by the trial court. Since the doctrine 
of res Ipsa loquitur has no application to the facts of this 
case, we know of no other theory upon which the case could 
have been submitted to the jury. We respectfully submit 
that the judgment of the trial court was correct, and should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
For CHRISTENSON, NOVAK & PAULSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent 
Dora Hartley 
Ashton Building 
Provo, Utah 
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